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Comments
NLRA Preemption of State Wrongful
Discharge Claims
The past two decades have seen a large increase in state law ac-
tions in which employees have asserted that they were wrongfully dis-
charged from their jobs.' Modem wrongful discharge actions have
developed as exceptions to the general American rule that an employ-
ment agreement of unspecified duration is presumed to be terminable
at the will of either party on notice to the other.2 Commentators gener-
1. See Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change In The Law,
40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 1 (1979); see also Murg and Scharman, Employment At Will: Do The
Exceptions Overwhelm The Rule?, 23 B.C.L. REv. 329, 329-30 (1982). Wrongful discharge
actions have been permitted on at least four theories: (1) violation of statute, see generally
Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 450-51, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 726
(1980) (surveying the "range of situations" in which the California Legislature has limited
the right of an employer to dismiss an employee at will); (2) denial of due process to a public
employee, see, e.g., Wilkerson v. City of Placentia, 118 Cal. App. 3d 435, 173 Cal. Rptr. 294
(1981); (3) violation of implied-in-fact contract, see infra notes 136-37 & accompanying text;
and (4) tort, see infra note 147 & accompanying text.
Scholarly dissatisfaction with the general American rule that employment is terminable
at will may be presumed to have contributed to the growth of wrongful discharge actions.
See, e.g., Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom" On Limiting the Abusive Exer-
cise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1404 (1967).
2. See Pugh v. Se's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 324, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 924
(1981); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 35, 432 A.2d 464, 467 (1981). This
general rule evolved during the social and economic changes which took place in the late
19th Century. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d at 319-20, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 920-
21; Note, Implied Contract Rights To Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REv. 335, 343 (1974) [herein-
after cited as Note, Job Securiy]. It replaced the centuries old common law view that em-
ployment was a status relation in which each party's rights were governed by a well-
developed set of legal rules. Note, Tortious Interference With Contractual Relations In The
Nineteenth Century. The Transformation of Property, Contract, And Tort, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1510, 1513-14 (1980).
The treatise in which the new rule first appeared was H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT (1877). Blumrosen, Workers'Rights Against Employers And
Unions: Justice Francis-A Judge For Our Season, 24 RtrGERS L. REv. 480, 481 (1970).
There was a laissez-faire ideology underlying the authority for the new general rule. See
Note, Job Security, supra, at 342-43; Comment, Recognizing the Employee'r Interests in Con-
tinued Employment-The California Cause ofAction/or Unjust Dismissal, 12 PAc. L.J. 69, 73
(1980) ("For a short period early in [the twentieth] century, the United States Supreme
Court elevated the employer's absolute power to discharge at will to the status of a constitu-
tionally protected right."). This laissez-faire ideology assumed that the individual employee
had bargaining power equal to that of his or her employer and voluntarily assumed the risk
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ally discuss these actions as being most useful to employees whose job
security is otherwise legally unprotected because they are not covered
by a collective bargaining agreement. 3 To some extent, state law ac-
tions have narrowed the traditional gulf in benefits and protections that
has existed between unionized employees and employees working with-
out the protection of a collective bargaining agreement.4 However,
state law actions also offer advantages to unionized employees, includ-
of injury on the job. Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The
Duty To Terminate Only In Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1824-26 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Good Faith]. Decades later, these assumptions were to some extent corrected.
Legislation was passed establishing minimum wages for workers. The National Labor Rela-
tions Act [hereinafter cited as NLRA] promoted unionization as a countervailing force to the
employer's economic power. Id See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1, 33 (1937). Also, workers' compensation laws effectively repealed the assumption of risk.
Note, Good Faith, supra, at 1827-28. While the high social costs which preceded the cor-
recting legislation cannot be denied, the terminable-at-will rule of employment, like general
incorporation laws, was very useful to a society which sought to facilitate the growth and
decline of business organizations but had little interest in influencing their internal behavior.
See generally Note, Job Security, supra, at 343 ("freedom of enterprise" is a useful term for
describing the underlying economic and social philosophy of the late 19th Century).
The late 19th century philosophy was a useful approach to correcting the discrepancy
between the society's huge technological potential for creating goods and services, and its
meager expertise in creating and managing organizations that could tap that potential. See
A. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN
BUSINESS 288 (1977). It is here submitted that there is now abundant expertise in creating
and managing organizations and that technological capabilities are being realized. Many
modern wrongful discharge actions are a legal response to a fundamentally different eco-
nomic problem, i.e., the presence of side effects (which economists call "externalities", see C.
SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 3, 25-26 (1977); L. THUROW, THE ZERO-
SUM SOCIETY 124 (1980)) of organizations' conduct. Pollution is the most commonly cited
example of an economic externality. Cf. infra note 145 & accompanying text (wrongful
discharge action alleging retaliation for refusing to falsify pollution control reports). How-
ever, the concept is of broad applicability, encompassing most of what legal scholars refer to
as "public policy" wrongful discharge actions. Compare Carman, Private Property and the
Regulation of Vertical Channel Systems, 2 J. MACROMARKETING 20, 22-23 (Spring 1982) (the
major purpose of all property law, including antitrust, is to control economic externalities)
with infra note 147 & accompanying text (discharge following refusal to engage in antitrust
violation). Modern wrongful discharge actions may be viewed as serving one or both of two
purposes. They supplement the legislation which partially corrected the imbalance in bar-
gaining power that exists between the individual employee and the large employer, and they
permit more direct implementation of public policies in business organizations.
The field of tax law provides a useful analogy for understanding this. Taxes used to be
enacted solely to raise revenue. Similarly, employment discharge disputes once centered
only on job security. Today, a tax provision may be enacted to provide an incentive or
disincentive for certain economic behavior. It is thus an instrument of organizational con-
trol. Some types of wrongful discharge actions have similarly become the instruments by
which public policies are implemented in large organizations.
3. See Murg and Scharman, supra note 1; Peck, supra note 1; Cf. Summers, Individual
Protection Against Unjust Dismissal.- Time For a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976).
4. See Summers, supra note 3, at 483 (1976). Legal protection of unionized employees
is grounded in § 7 of the NLRA, 49 Stat. 452 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-157
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ing the opportunity to collect punitive damages.5
The apparent equities of the situation do not suggest an obvious
answer to the question of whether state law wrongful discharge claims
by unionized employees should be preempted under the supremacy
clause.6 The employer's bargain under the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) 7 typically provides that the equitable remedies of rein-
statement with back pay are the maximum penalties that the employer
will incur if its discharge of an employee is found to have been without
"just cause". 8 However, state law grants the employee a substantive
right not to be discharged which is independent of the collective agree-
(1976)) which protects the right of employees of firms engaged in interstate commerce "to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.. . ." Id § 157.
5. Punitive damages are available in California both under the "public policy" theory
of wrongful discharge, Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 170, 610 P.2d 1330,
1331, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 840 (1980), and under the "contract" theory (for violation of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing), Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal.
App. 3d 443, 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (1980). In addition to the availability of punitive
damages, any or all of several other factors may make a state law action preferable to arbi-
tration under a collective bargaining agreement. The employee may feel that his or her
union would not vigorously represent him or her in arbitration proceedings, or that the
designated arbitrator is unfairly pro-management. Lastly, the employee may believe that a
jury would be more sympathetic to his or her case, or that state law will provide emotional
distress damages not available under the collective agreement.
6. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land .. " U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2.
Under this clause, state or local action that conflicts with a constitutionally authorized act of
Congress is invalid. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 377 (1978). According to
Cox, all members of the U.S. Supreme Court now agree that state law may be preempted on
grounds other than the major line of labor law preemption cases which follows San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). Cox, Recent Developments in Labor
Law Preemption, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 277, 292 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Cox, Recent Develop-
ments, 1980] See infra notes 40-43 & accompanying text.
While this Comment addresses only the preemption considerations, the law of any state
may, independently of federal law, prefer arbitration to litigation. The court in Vaughn v.
Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co. 289 Or. 73, 611 P.2d 281, 287-90 (1980), see infra note
10, for example, dealt with this question at greater length than the preemption question. See
also Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 Ill. App. 3d 402, 407 N.E.2d 95 (1980), described
infra at note 10, and Porter v. Quillin, 123 Cal. App. 3d 869, 876, 177 Cal. Rptr. 45, 49
(1981) where the court did not reach the preemption question because it concluded that the
California Legislature did not intend to override the provisions of a federal collective bar-
gaining agreement.
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
8. A general statement to the effect that employees may be discharged for "cause" or
'just cause" was found in 80% of the collective bargaining agreements surveyed in one ma-
jor study. Specific grounds for discharge were found in 65% of the agreements. Many of the
contracts contained both general and specific provisions. 2, BUREAU OF NATIONAL AF-
FAIRS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: NEGOTIATION AND CoNTRACTs, 40:1 (1978). Grievance
procedures were included in 99% of the agreements. Id at 51:1. Most union contracts pro-
vide reinstatement with back pay to an employee who has been unjustly discharged. Id at
40:181.
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ment and which his or her union arguably may not waive.9 Courts in
four states have given three different answers when asked if there could
be a nonpreempted wrongful discharge claim by a unionized employee
who alleged that his or her discharge was in retaliation for pursuing
workers' compensation benefits.' 0
Wrongful discharge actions have been classified according to
whether they were based on the theory of an individual contract be-
tween the employer and employee or were predicated on considera-
tions of public policy. " Many modem wrongful discharge actions are
intended to protect interests such as job security, pension benefits, and
commission arrangements based on an employment agreement, and
therefore involve subjects of collective bargaining.1 2
Not all wrongful discharge actions, however, are mere employ-
ment disputes. Contrary to the assumption underlying both the ancient
law of employment and the NLRA that employment-related rights and
duties are the only interests in such private controversies,' 3 some types
of wrongful discharge actions are devices by which state policies unre-
lated to employment may be furthered by private litigation.' 4 The case
which created the tort of wrongful discharge in California, for example,
9. See Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 22 Cal. 3d 658, 665
n.5, 586 P.2d 564, 568 n.5, 150 Cal. Rptr. 250, 254 n.5 (1978).
10. Two courts deciding workers' compensation discharge cases involving unionized
employees found that a state court action and an administrative agency's decision, respec-
tively, were not preempted by federal labor law. Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Comp.
Appeals Bd., 22 Cal. 3d 658, 586 P.2d 564, 150 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1978); Vaughn v. Pacific
Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 289 Or. 73, 611 P.2d 281 (1980).
The appellate court in Thompson v. Monsanto Co., 559 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977), found that an action under state law was preempted by federal labor law. However,
the Texas Supreme Court has on several occasions limited the scope of that decision. See
infra note 21.
The court in Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 Ill. App. 3d 402, 407 N.E.2d 95 (1980)
provided a third answer to this question: because the collective bargaining agreement pro-
tected the employee's interest, the court decided as a matter of state law not to extend the
wrongful discharge action beyond employees who were terminable-at-will. In order to focus
on preemption issues, this Comment assumes that the wrongful discharge action is intended
by the state to include unionized employees. See also supra note 6 and infra note 145.
The only commentary regarding whether a unionized employee could bring a state law
wrongful discharge action appears to be Summers, supra note 3, at 530-3 1; Note, A Common
Law Action For TheAbusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1457-63 (1975);
Comment, Intimations Of Federal Removal Jurisdiction In Labor Cases- The Pleadings
Nexus, 1981 DUKE L.J. 743, 750-56.
11. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 322, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 922
(1981).
12. See infra notes 136-42 & accompanying text.
13. See supra note 2.
14. See infra notes 144-54 & accompanying text; Comment, Protecting The Private Sec-
tor At Will Employee Who "Blows the "histle" . A Cause ofAction Based Upon Determinants
of Public Policy, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 777.
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involved an employee who refused to fix gasoline prices, which would
have been a criminal act under state trade regulation laws.15 In such
cases the discharge action is an enforcement device which is more ap-
propriately characterized as part of the trade regulation or other sub-
stantive area of law than as part of the state's law of employment
relations. Similar state interests are found in cases involving employer
retaliation for "whistle blowing," reporting for jury duty, and for asser-
tion of workers' compensation rights. 16 In the union context, none of
these interests are subject to the collective bargaining process.
The United States Supreme Court in Teamsters Union v. Oliver17
and Malone v. White Motor Corp. 18 established the rule of federal pre-
emption that a state may not interfere with the rights and duties of
parties to a collective agreement on a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining.19 The preemption question is important in this area be-
cause whether federal labor law or state law applies often will involve a
choice between the employer's bargain for equitable remedies in the
collective agreement and punitive damages available under state law.20
Preemption may also involve a choice between the employer's bargain
for an arbitration mechanism and the employee's desire to litigate the
dispute.2' Under the Oliver-Malone rule these choices would result in
15. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1980).
16. See infra notes 143-50 & accompanying text.
17. 358 U.S. 283 (1959). "[T]he inconsistent application of state law [to modify a
mandatory term of a federally authorized collective bargaining agreement] is necessarily
outside the power of the State." Id at 296 (citations omitted). See infra notes 50-69 &
accompanying text.
18. 435 U.S. 497 (1978).
19. 358 U.S. at 296-97; 435 U.S. at 513. The Court's language in Oliver has been criti-
cized as "manifestly broader than required to decide the only issue that was before the
Court." Cox, Recent Developments, 1980, supra note 6, at 298. The language used, 358 U.S.
at 296-97, was manifestly broader than necessary because it strikes down substantive state
policies which evenhandedly regulate both collectively bargained-for and individually bar-
gained-for terms of employment, such as the pension funding charge in Malone. See infra
notes 58-62, 74 & accompanying text. However, the Court only needed to find that a state
statute which discriminates against collective labor activity, such as the antitrust statute
which was at issue, was preempted by the NLRA's protection of collective labor activity.
See Cox, Recent Developments, 1980, supra note 6, at 298.
20. See supra notes 5 and 8 & accompanying text.
21. See R. GORMAN, BAsIc TExT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 543 (1976). If a state permits imposition of punitive damages, and the bargain-
ing agreement provides only for equitable remedies, then a decision that the state law is not
preempted will cause a deviation from the terms of the bargaining agreement. However, it
will not always be true that the decision whether or not state law is preempted implicates
federally preferred arbitration procedures.
Federally preferred arbitration procedures will be implicated when the employee files a
wrongful discharge action under circumstances where he or she could not sue on the collec-
tive agreement. For example, an employee might file suit without making any attempt to
utilize the agreement's arbitration procedures, or desert the arbitration procedures at some
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federal preemption of state wrongful discharge claims. However, any
standard used to determine when federal law preempts state law should
differentiate between the purely private and broad policy interests pro-
tected by wrongful discharge actions, and should focus on whether the
interest being protected is subject to collective bargaining under the
NLRA.
This Comment analyzes the current tests of preemption under fed-
eral labor law and their relationship to the collective bargaining sys-
tem. The Comment then examines legal developments after the Oliver
and Malone decisions that provide a basis for narrowing the Oliver-
Malone rule and for differentiating between the various types of
wrongful discharge actions. The Comment concludes that wrongful
discharge actions serve one or both of two purposes and that these dif-
ferent purposes should be the basis for different preemption standards.
When an action is brought as a supplement to legislation intended to
correct the imbalance in bargaining power that existed between the in-
dividual employee and the large employer, and is based on state law
protecting interests that are the subject of collective bargaining, such as
job security, pensions or wages, the state law should be preempted by
the federal system of collective bargaining. When the action is brought
to directly enforce public policy and to protect interests not subject to
collective bargaining, such as worker's compensation benefits, preemp-
tion should not be invoked to bar state wrongful discharge actions.
stage of a multi-level grievance appeals process. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 175
n.3 (1967). Or, the employee might file a state law claim after receiving an adverse arbitra-
tion decision. In these cases, immunity of the parties' bargaining agreement terms and the
federal policy favoring arbitration are the interests implicated. The various ways in which
these interests may be affected, however, are beyond the scope of this Comment. Instead,
the assumption made here is that the employee has filed a state law claim without attempt-
ing to use the arbitration procedures. However, it should be noted that Texas courts have
considered utilization of grievance procedures to be relevant to the preemption question. In
Thompson v. Monsanto Co., 559 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) the appellate court de-
cided that the plaintiffs state law workers' compensation discharge claim was preempted
where there had been an adverse arbitration decision under the collective agreement. How-
ever, the Texas Supreme Court has distinguished this case on three occasions and held state
law claims not to be preempted where there was no final arbitral decision. See Richards v.
Hughes Tool Co., 615 S.W.2d 196, 197 (Tex. 1981); Spainhouer v. Western Electric Co., 615
S.W.2d 190, 191 (Tex. 1981); Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. 1980).
Federally preferred arbitration procedures will not be implicated when an employee
files the state law claim instead of filing a court action to enforce the collective bargaining
agreement. An individual employee may sue his employer under § 301(a) of the Taft-Hart-
ley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976), for violation of the collective bargaining agreement with-
out exhausting contractual grievance procedures where the parties have not intended a
grievance and arbitration procedure to be the exclusive remedy for breach of the contract,
see Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 657-58 (1965), or where the employer
repudiates the grievance procedures or the union has breached its duty of fair representa-
tion. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185 (1967).
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Preemption Under Current Labor Law
Labor Law Preemption And Collective Bargaining
When a state provides enforceable legal rights to its citizens, a de-
cision that federal law displaces or modifies the state law must be based
on application of the supremacy clause of the Constitution.22 The first
inquiry in a preemption analysis is whether the language of a statute or
its legislative history indicates clear congressional intent to preempt or
to sustain state law.23 While the states generally have authority under
their police power to regulate employment relations,24 the Supreme
Court has decided that under the commerce clause25 Congress may ex-
ercise plenary power to regulate labor relations in industries affecting
interstate commerce.26 A decision whether a wrongful discharge claim
is preempted involves consideration of the overlap of the NLRA and
state law.
Under the NLRA, the authority of the union as agent for all em-
ployees in the bargaining unit is fundamental.27 Closely related to this
concept is the principle that federal substantive rules of contract inter-
pretation are to be applied to collective bargaining agreements. 2 One
commentator accordingly has noted that "[e]ven some freedom of con-
tract is to be sacrificed for the employee who could secure a better bar-
gain for himself than did the majority union."29 Thus, the "purpose of
providing. . . for the collective agreement is to supersede the terms of
separate agreements of employees ....
Subject to its duty to fairly represent all subgroups and individual
employees in the unit, the union has authority to decide what substan-
tive terms to seek and on which items to acquiesce to management.3 1
22. See supra note 6; see also Cox, Recent Developments, 1980, supra note 6, at 277.
Federal law has so completely dominated labor relations for the last half century that this
basic premise is often overlooked. See also infra note 70.
23. See Cox, Recent Developments, 1980 supra note 6, at 292. In labor preemption
cases, "[tlhe purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone." Malone v. White Motor
Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103
(1963)). See also New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 527
(1979); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 187 (1978).
24. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976).
25. "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce ... among the sev-
eral States .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
26. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
27. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944); see R. GORMAN, Supra note 21, at 374-
78; THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 304-05 (C. Morris ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Morris].
28. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957); see Note,
supra note 10, at 1457.
29. R. GORMAN, supra note 21, at 377.
30. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. at 338; see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 182; Morris,
supra note 27, at 305.
31. See R. GORMAN, supra note 21, at 696.
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On some subjects, such as wages, pensions, workloads and vacations,
the parties are under a mandatory duty to bargain. 32 Employee dis-
charge also is a mandatory subject of bargaining. 33 Bargaining on such
subjects as performance bonds, legal liability clauses, and internal
union affairs is permitted but not mandatory.3 4
Professor Archibald Cox, the leading commentator on the subject,
has formulated in the following way the fundamental principle under-
lying federal labor law preemption.35 In enacting federal labor laws
Congress provided a framework within which employees could organ-
ize themselves and bargain collectively with their employers concern-
ing the terms and conditions of their employment.36 In establishing
this framework, "Congress struck a balance of protection, prohibition,
and laissez faire" 37 which a state may not upset by enforcing its views
concerning accommodation of the same interests of employers, labor
unions, employees and the public in labor relations.38
Federal labor law reflects this general principle in two separate
areas of labor law preemption.39 The first area, usually identified with
the case of San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,40 protects the
exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
32. Morris, supra note 27, at 390, 393, 404.
33. Id. at 404. "Grievance procedures" and "arbitration" are also mandatory subjects.
Id To be entitled to the benefits of a collective bargaining agreement an employee obvi-
ously must be working for an employer who is a party to the agreement. Employees are
therefore interested in a procedure for discharge which will protect their access to the bene-
fits of their bargain. Since employee discharge is related to effective management, this sub-
ject is also important to the employer. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d
311, 330, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 928 (1981). In recognition of these considerations, employee
discharge is a mandatory subject of bargaining. In almost all collective bargaining agree-
ments this system is initially enforced by private arbitrators. Morris, supra note 27, at 480-
81. The arbitrators often are not lawyers. R. GORMAN, supra note 21, at 543. Their func-
tion is to give effect to the intent of the parties, although they have broad discretion as to
how best to accomplish this. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974); R.
GORMAN, supra note 21, at 542-43, 606.
34. Morris, supra note 27, at 430-31.
35. Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337, 1352, 1354 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Cox, Preemption Revisited, 19721. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Carpenters, 430 U.S. 180, 193-94 n.23 (1978).
36. Cox, Preemption Revisited, 1972, supra note 35, at 1352; see also NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Co. 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937); R. GORMAN, supra note 21, at 1; MORRIS, supra
note 27, at 27-28.
37. Cox, Preemption Revisited, 1972, supra note 35, at 1352.
38. Id at 1352-53; see also Cox, Recent Developments, 1980 supra note 6, at 293.
39. Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n., 427 U.S. 132, 138, 140
(1976). The extremely strong presumption in labor law that state law is preempted, see
Morris, supra note 27, at 784-85, applies to preemption based upon National Labor Rela-
tions Board [hereinafter NLRB] jurisdiction rather than preemption of state law affecting
the outcome of collective bargaining. See, e.g., New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't
of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 532-33 (1979). Cf infra note 57 & accompanying text.
40. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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to enforce the specific protections of section 7 and the specific prohibi-
tions of section 8 of the NLRA.41 Because the NLRB cannot control
the substantive terms of a collective bargaining agreement, 42 this area
generally is not relevant to preemption of the typical wrongful dis-
charge claim.43
41. See id at 244; 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158 (1976). Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180, 199 n.30 (1978), describes the "two quite different" possible meanings of the
word "protected" in labor law preemption. One use of the word refers to the right to engage
in collective activity which is enforced by the NLRB and with which neither an employer
nor a state may interfere. The other use of the word "protected" refers to the laissez-faire
zone of conduct which Congress intended to be controlled by the free play of economic
forces. Such activity is immune from state but not from employer retaliation. Professor Cox
suggests that "permitted activities" would be a better shorthand for the latter concept, which
is concerned with preemption to protect collective bargaining. Cox, Preemption Revisited,
1972, supra note 35, at 1346.
42. Note, FederalPre-emption and Collective BargainingAgreements, 1966 Wis. L. Rnv.
532, one of the few commentaries on the Oliver-Malone rule, see also infra notes 52, 98, 116
and 126, explains why the Garmon rule is usually not applicable to the conflict between state
law and collective agreements. The note points out that NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Union, 361
U.S. 477 (1960), established that the NLRB has no power to limit the substantive provisions
of collective bargaining agreements. Note, supra, at 533. Consequently, with respect to the
federal policy supporting such bargains, "whether a substantive provision is 'arguably sub-
ject' to the NLRB's jurisdiction is a meaningless question." d at 534; see also R. GORMAN,
supra note 21, at 535-36. For a clear description of the various ways in which the NLRA
may preempt state law, see U.S.A. Chamber of Commerce v. State, 89 N.J. 131, 141-46, 445
A.2d 353, 358-61 (1982).
43. See infra note 76. The NLRB has determined that pursuing workers' compensation
benefits is activity protected by § 7 of the NLRA. Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp., 245
N.L.R.B. 1053, enforcement denied, 635 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1980). While the Supreme Court
has yet to address the question pursuing workers' compensation benefits would seem to be
activity at least "arguably" subject to NLRB jurisdiction. A state workers' compensation
discharge claim may therefore require analysis under the preemption cases following San
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). But see Cox, Preemption Revis-
ited, 1972, supra note 35, at 1355 (if states have authority to affect the balance of economic
power by substantive rules of law, then the divergences in interpretation, procedure and
remedy which are the basis of preemption by NLRB jurisdiction are of little concern to
national labor policy). To the extent that analysis under Garmon is required for such a case,
it is beyond the scope of this Comment.
Since the Garmon line of cases comprises the bulk of labor preemption law several
courts have understandably, but mistakenly cited to them when considering claims which do
not implicate the NLRB's jurisdiction. The preemption cases based upon NLRB jurisdic-
tion indicate that differences in remedies and procedures between the NLRB and state sys-
tems are a reason for preempting state law. See Id at 1342-44.
However, when, as in most wrongful discharge actions, NLRB jurisdiction is not impli-
cated and the only issue is state influence on the balance of economic power, differences in
remedy and procedure are of little concern. See id at 1345, 1355. Thus, the reasoning of the
cases following Garmon is largely irrelevant. See New York Tel. Co. v. New York State
Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 529-30, 533 (1979). For example, many cases in the Garmon
line say that the distinction between general state laws and state labor laws is not relevant to
federal preemption. See, e.g., Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 300 (1977). This reason-
ing, however, may not be relevant where the rationale for preemption is not NLRB jurisdic-
tion but rather is the balance of economic power between unions and management. See
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The second area of labor law preemption, which concerns the im-
pact of state regulations on collective bargaining, is relevant to wrong-
ful discharge claims. In this area, "the crucial inquiry" is whether
Congress intended that the conduct involved should be controlled only
by the free play of economic forces and not regulated by the individual
states.44
There are two branches of preemption analysis in this second area.
First, there are cases addressing the preemption of state laws that affect
parties presently engaged in collective bargaining. This branch will be
called "bargaining process preemption. ' 45 Second, there are cases ad-
dressing preemption of state regulation which would interfere with the
rights and duties of parties to an existing collective bargaining agree-
ment. This branch will be called "bargaining agreement preemp-
tion." 46 In each of these two branches of preemption, tests have been
developed to determine whether federal law supersedes state law. The
next two sections of this Comment discuss these tests.
Bargaining Process Preemption: The Cox-New York Telephone
Plurality Test
In his 1972 article, Professor Cox argued that in enacting federal
labor statutes Congress intended to preempt state laws regulating col-
lective labor activity, but not to preempt state laws of general applica-
bility.47 In other words, Congress did not intend to preempt state laws
which "apply to the general public or substantial segments thereof
without regard to whether the individual is an employer, union, or em-
New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 546 n.* (1979) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 193 (1978).
44. Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 140-41
(1976).
45. One case that falls in this category is Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976). Machinists held that states are not free to interfere with
a union's concerted refusal to work overtime. In Machinists the Supreme Court also for-
mally overruled the case of Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336
U.S. 245 (1949) (commonly known as the Briggs-Stratton case). 427 U.S. at 154. Another
case in this category is Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964). In Morton, the
Court held that a state could not interfere during a labor dispute with a union's attempt to
noncoercively persuade customers to boycott the union's employer.
46. See infra notes 50-69 & accompanying text.
47. Cox, Preemption Revisited, 1972, supra note 35, at 1355-56. The Supreme Court
now infers that Congress intended to preempt some state labor laws which would regulate
activity for which there are not specific federal protections or prohibitions. See Cox, Recent
Developments, 1980, supra note 6, at 292. Cf. Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1949) (Briggs-Strduton case), overruled, Machinists v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 154 (1976). However, Professor
Cox points out that "iclonceivably, the problem could be approached more eclectically with
the states left to add some labor relations laws but not others." Cox, Preemption Revisited,
1972, supra note 35, at 1348.
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ployee concerned with unionization or a labor dispute.148 Under this
analysis, however, Congress did intend to preempt state laws addressed
specifically to organized labor.
In the most recent bargaining process preemption case heard by
the Supreme Court, New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Depart-
ment of Labor,49 a three-Justice plurality largely adopted the preemp-
tion test proposed by Professor Cox. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
White and Rehnquist, applied the Cox test in determining that a state
unemployment compensation law which awarded benefits to employ-
ees whether or not they were on strike was a law of general applicabil-
ity and therefore was not preempted.50
Bargaining Agreement Preemption: The Oliver-Malone Test
In the area of "bargaining agreement preemption" the Supreme
Court has decided two cases, Teamsters Union v. Oliver5I and Malone v.
White Motor Corp. 52 Oliver involved a bargaining agreement between
the teamsters union and an association of interstate motor carriers.
This agreement prescribed terms which regulated the minimum rental
payments to be made when a motor vehicle was leased to a carrier by
an owner who drove his vehicle in the carrier's service.53 The terms of
the agreement resolved two decades of controversy over whether the
carriers had been paying inadequate rentals to owner-operators, under-
mining the drivers' wage scale.5 4 The Ohio Court of Common Pleas,
48. Cox, Preemption Revisited, 1972, supra note 35, at 1355-56.
49. 440 U.S. 519 (1979). The case has been described as "the most complex case to be
considered by the Supreme Court in recent years." French, The Views ofJustice Rehnquist
Concerning the Proper Role of the States in National Labor Relations Policy, 17 TULSA L.J.
76, 92 (1981). While it should be noted that the plurality opinion was joined by only three
justices, for purposes of conciseness it will hereinafter be referred to as "the Cox-New York
Telephone plurality test."
Justice Brennan expressed partial agreement with the plurality approach. Citing Pro-
fessor Cox's 1972 article, he said that "the distinction between laws of general applicability
and laws directed particularly at labor-management relations perhaps has more signfi-
cance" in the area of bargaining process preemption than in the area of NLRB preemption.
However, he was "not at all sure that the New York statute is a law of general applicability."
440 U.S. 519, 546 n.* (Brennan, J., concurring).
Of the five Justices who entirely disagreed with the approach, four remain on the Court
as of the time of publication of this Comment. Justice Stewart has retired.
50. For further description of bargaining process preemption see infra notes 70-74 &
accompanying text.
51. 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
52. 435 U.S. 497 (1978). The Court in Malone admitted that the language of the Oliver
opinion was quite broad. Id at 513. It has been suggested that Malone "arguably" provides
a "new interpretation" of Oliver. See Constitutional Review: Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 6
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 19, 227 (1978); see also supra note 19.
53. 358 U.S. at 284-85.
54. Id at 291-94.
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applying Ohio antitrust law to invalidate the provision, found that the
minimum rental clause was a "remote and indirect approach to the
subject of wages."'' 5
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Ohio court's finding and
held that the provision fell within the category of subjects for which
collective bargaining is mandatory. 56 The Court concluded that state
law was preempted because the agreement was between parties who
were under a mandatory duty to bargain collectively within a compre-
hensive federal system created by Congress. Thus, the agreement took
on the force of federal law and preempted state law.57
The Supreme Court did not confront another case of inconsistency
between state law and a collective bargaining agreement until its 1978
decision of Malone v. White Motor Corp.58 In Malone, Minnesota law
required payment to the state of a "pension funding charge" by any
employer who terminated a pension plan.59 The Minnesota Commis-
sioner applied a funding charge to White Motor Corporation's termi-
nation of its collectively bargained pension plan.60 Four of the seven
Justices participating in the decision found that Congress, in passing
the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act,6 1 had permitted states
55. id at 293.
56. Id at 294-95. In NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958), the Supreme
Court affirmed and adopted the NLRB's distinction between "mandatory" and "permissive"
subjects of collective bargaining. Morris, supra note 27, at 382.
57. This preemptive force, however, was not unlimited. The focus of preemption was
state policy "which seeks specifically to adjust relationships in the world of commerce." 358
U.S. at 297. In contrast, local "health or safety" regulations would not be preempted. Id
Another qualification of the Oliver rule was that by its terms it preempted only the "incon-
sistent" application of state law. See Walker Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 27 Wis. 2d
669, 679-80, 135 N.W.2d 307, 313 (1965). The leading labor preemption case decided prior
to Oliver was Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). Garner is famous for the
passage stating that in enacting the NLRA "Congress did not merely lay down a substantive
rule of law to be enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the par-
ties. . . . A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to pro-
duce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive law." 346
U.S. at 490-91. In view of this passage, Justice Brennan's use of the word "inconsistent"
when he wrote the Oliver opinion cannot be considered accidental. Thus, under the original
formulation of the Oliver-Malone rule, a state court would have been empowered to apply a
"consistent" state rule to a wrongful discharge case, even if the employee had not pursued
arbitration procedures. Cf. supra note 21. In later cases however, the U.S. Supreme Court
elevated the importance of arbitration procedures in federal labor law. See Republic Steel
Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965); Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steel-
workers v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). But cf Alexander v. Gard-
ner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 n.5 (1974).
58. 435 U.S. 497 (1978).
59. Id. at 501.
60. Id. at 502.
61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309, repealed by Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, § Ill(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1031 (1976).
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to regulate all pension plans, "including those plans which were the
product of collective bargaining. ' 62 The majority thus validated the
pension funding charge as an example of a congressionally intended
exception to Oliver's general rule that a state may not interfere with the
rights and duties of parties to a collective bargaining agreement.63 In
so doing, the majority acknowledged that Oliver's general rule of pre-
emption was still good law.64 The Justices who dissented in Malone
were stronger in their support of the Oliver rule. 65 In separate dissent-
ing opinions, Justices Stewart and Powell, each of whom was joined by
Chief Justice Burger, emphasized the importance of immunizing from
state alteration the bargain struck by parties to collective bargaining. 66
Taken together, Oliver and Malone establish a general rule for
bargaining agreement preemption that state law which interferes with
the rights and duties of parties to a collective bargaining agreement on
a mandatory subject of collective bargaining is preempted by federal
law.67 Although bargaining agreement preemption is based on the
same inquiry into congressional intent regarding the free play of eco-
nomic forces as bargaining process preemption,68 application of the
Cox-New York Telephone plurality test and the Oliver-Malone test to
wrongful discharge actions produces opposite results. 69 The next sec-
tion of this Comment will analyze these applications.
Application of Current Tests to Wrongful Discharge Actions
As narrowly defined by the Cox-New York Telephone plurality
test,70 preempted state labor laws include only those which discriminate
62. 435 U.S. at 505.
63. Id at 513-14.
64. Id at 512-13.
65. See id at 515 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id at 516 (Powell, J., dissenting); Cox, Recent
Developments, 1980, supra note 6, at 300.
66. 435 U.S. at 515, 516. In light of this rationale for the general rule favoring preemp-
tion, the dissenters found insufficient indication of congressional intent to except the subject
of pension plans from the general rule. Id
67. See id at 513 (1978).
68. See Cox, Recent Developments, 1980, supra note 6, at 296. The fundamental prob-
lem in both areas is the extent of state authority to regulate economic relations when such
regulation will affect the balance of economic power between management and labor.
69. See infra notes 74-77 & accompanying text.
70. Sharp disagreement exists among members of the Supreme Court with respect to
two aspects of the Cox test. One area of disagreement concerns the usefulness of the distinc-
tion between general state laws and state labor laws. See supra note 43. However, if the
distinction is accepted, there is then disagreement as to the scope of the definition of the state
labor laws which are preempted. See 440 U.S. at 546 n.* (Brennan, J., concurring).
Arguably, the Supreme Court should consciously narrow preemption rules in the labor
field because there is less potential for industrial strife in the late 20th Century than there
was when the NLRA was enacted a half-century earlier. See supra note 2.
In cases of preemption under the commerce clause the Court generally starts with the
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for or against collective labor activity. 71 State antitrust statutes, such as
the one applied by Ohio courts in Oliver, are clearly preempted. This is
because "[s]uch statutes are based upon a view of policy towards com-
binations and collective action in the market place which is the very
subject addressed by Congress in the NLRA.' 72 A state law which
would prohibit supplying individuals for employment to replace em-
ployees who are on strike also is preempted, because it attempts to dis-
criminate in favor of collective labor activity.73
Under the narrowly defined Cox-New York Telephone plurality
test, state laws regulating aspects of employment which do not differen-
premise that a state law is valid. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978).
In the labor field Congress apparently authorized the Court to formulate the rules for pre-
emption of state law. See Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953) (federal
labor law "leaves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how
much. We must spell out from conflicting indications of congressional will the area in which
state action is still permissible.") In formulating preemption rules the Court began by not-
ing that in labor cases "[tihe purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone." Malone v.
White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978), quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375
U.S. 96, 103 (1963). Congress' fundamental purpose in enacting the NLRA was to alleviate
industrial strife. See R. GORMAN, supra note 21, at 1. Taken together, these propositions
lead to the conclusion that Congress has authorized the Court to formulate rules that will
preempt state laws only to the extent necessary to alleviate industrial strife. By this analysis
if there is little potential for industrial strife in bargaining process cases such as New York
Telephone, then it was appropriate for the plurality to adopt the narrow test of preemption
advanced by Professor Cox.
More generally, the Court might take judicial notice of the fact that the potential for
industrial strife in the United States has been greatly reduced in the last half century. This
arguably is attributable to "altered circumstances." See Barbash, Values in Industrial Rela-
dons: The Case of the Adversary Principle, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIA-
TION SERIES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING 5 (B. Dennis ed.
1980). For example, there may now be greater congruence than previously in the interests of
capital and labor. See id at 5, 6. But cf. L. THUROW, supra note 2, at 177-78 ("we are
probably entering a period of rising income inequality"). Also, the persons formulating
corporate industrial relations policies may now tend to be professionally trained managers,
and less likely than earlier managers to provoke industrial strife. See D. BOK & J. DUNLOP,
LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 235 (1970) ("the public can well expect a lessening
of conflict as more and more bargaining relationships grow older and more professional");
Id at 241-52.
This analysis supports the narrowing of the rules of labor law preemption which was
undertaken by the New York Telephone plurality, and which is advanced in this Comment
with respect to the Oliver-Malone rule.
71. For example, in the area of preemption based upon NLRB jurisdiction, state laws
granting employees the right to organize and bargain collectively are preempted as applied
to employees subject to jurisdiction under the NLRA. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S.
485 (1953).
72. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 193 n.23 (1978) (citing Cox,
Preemption Revisited, 1972, supra note 35, at 1357). As another example, a state law which
would prohibit supplying individuals for employment to replace employees who are on
strike also is preempted, because it attempts to discriminate in favor of collective labor activ-
ity. See U.S.A. Chamber of Commerce v. State, 89 N.J. 131, 445 A.2d 353 (1982).
73. See U.S.A. Chamber of Commerce v. State, 89 N.J. 131, 445 A.2d 353 (1982).
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tiate between organized and unorganized employees would not be pre-
empted. For example, the pension funding charge which Minnesota
imposed in the Malone case would not be preempted because it did not
differentiate between pensions which were part of individual employ-
ment contracts and pensions which were collectively bargained for.74
Because state law wrongful discharge actions are authorized for any
employee within the state and do not discriminate against collective
bargaining as a method of regulating the employment relationship,
they apparently would not be preempted by this test.
The opposite result obtains from application of the general Oliver-
Malone rule of bargaining agreement preemption. Employee dis-
charge is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining 75 and therefore
under the general Oliver-Malone rule all wrongful discharge actions
would be preempted. 76 However, there are two recognized exceptions
74. See Cox, Recent Developments, 1980, supra note 6, at 298, 300. Similarly, under
this approach state laws which forbade mandatory retirement below a specified age, or im-
posed a ceiling on wage increases without discriminating between individual and collective
agreements would not be preempted despite being inconsistent with the terms of a collective
agreement. Id at 297.
75. See supra notes 31-34 & accompanying text.
76. See Summers, supra note 3, at 530 n.215. Two opinions from state appellate courts
and one from a federal district court also indicate that the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in
Malone and Oliver provide the proper framework for analyzing the potential conflict be-
tween state law and the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. In Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Co. v. Department of Indus., 87 Wis. 2d 56, 273 N.W.2d 786 (1978), the employer
sought review of the state department's decision that disparate treatment of pregnant wo-
men, under the disability plan which the union and employer had negotiated, involved sex
discrimination under the state's Fair Employment Act. In affirming the Department's deci-
sion, the court addressed the argument by Goodyear that Malone established that absent
"clear and evident" congressional intent to permit state power, "states cannot alter the terms
of a federally lawful labor agreement." 87 Wis. 2d at 79, 273 N.W.2d at 798. The court
determined that in enacting title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-17
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980), Congress expressly preserved state laws regarding employment
discrimination and the state action was therefore not preempted. Accord Brown Co., Absor-
bent Products Division v. Department of Indus., 476 F. Supp. 209 (W.D. Wis. 1979). The
other state court opinion discussing the relevance of Malone and Oliver to conflict between
state law and a collective agreement is Porter v. Quillin, 123 Cal. App. 3d 869, 875, 177 Cal.
Rptr, 45, 48 (1981), cited supra at note 6.
In deciding that a workers' compensation discharge claim was preempted, the court in
Thompson v. Monsanto Co., 559 S.W.2d 873, 874-77 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) erroneously
relied on § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) (1976). That provision reads as follows: "Suits for violation of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization . . . may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties .. " The Supreme Court decided that
Congress intended this provision to be more than jurisdictional, and that it authorized courts
to fashion federal substantive law of contract interpretation rather than use state law. Tex-
tile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957). In further developing this
doctrine, the Supreme Court in Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962),
stated that "federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the statute." The
court in Thompson relied on this passage in its wrongful discharge preemption decision. 559
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to the general rule. 77
"Congressional Intent" Exception
In some cases courts have recognized exceptions to the general
rule of preemption when they have found that Congress did not intend
state law to be preempted by the NLRA. 78 In Malone the Supreme
Court found that Congress had not intended to preempt state laws re-
garding employee pension plans.7 9 The Court found that in the context
of a legislative history which contemplated a broad regulatory role for
the states, Congress had preserved state authority to regulate pension
plans. The Court held that this authority extended to plans which were
the product of collective bargaining. 80
The Justices in Malone disagreed on what standards should be
used to determine congressional intent where activity is not affirma-
S.W.2d at 876. However, the area covered by § 301(a) is the law of contract interpretation
and has the purpose of giving effect to the intent of the private parties to collective bargain-
ing. See supra notes 27-33 & accompanying text. To preempt wrongful discharge actions
one would also have to include in the area covered by the statute the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement on the subject of discharge. That crucial step presupposes that the
terms of a collective agreement preempt all inconsistent state law, which was the sweeping
rule of bargaining agreement preemption. See supra notes 50-69 and infra notes 128-29 &
accompanying text. The soundness of that presupposition is the subject of this Comment.
Using § 30 t(a) as a basis for preemption also raises difficulties of statutory construction.
Compare Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 460-62 (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting) (by "the alchemy of construction" the Supreme Court has attributed to Taft-Hart-
ley's § 301 "an occult content") with Morris, supra note 27, at 783 n.12 (described infra at
note 155).
77. Note, Private Preemption of State Labor Laws: A Constitutional Objection, 58 TEX.
L. REV. 1099, 1100 (1980).
78. See, e.g., Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978); Brown Co., Absor-
bent Products Div. v. Department of Indus., 476 F. Supp. 209 (W.D. Wis. 1979); Goodyear
Tire and Rubber Co. v. Department of Indus., 87 Wis. 2d 56, 273 N.W.2d 786 (1978).
79. 435 U.S. at 512.
The four opinions in New York Telephone also demonstrated great disagreement as to
what evidence of legislative history would constitute congressional intent to sustain state
law. While divided as to their reasoning, the three concurring Justices thought that the
deletion from congressional bills of prohibitions against payment of unemployment com-
pensation to strikers, see 440 U.S. at 544 n.44, amounted to a clear congressional decision to
give states discretion to make such payments. Id at 546-47 (Brennan, J., concurring); id at
549 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The three dissenting Justices reached the opposite conclu-
sion, ie., that the relevant legislative histories amounted to a congressional decision to with-
hold such state power. Id. at 561-63. The plurality opinion combined an analysis of
legislative histories with Professor Cox's preemption test and an analogy to cases decided
under the "local interest" exception of San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236 (1959), see infra notes 89-94 & accompanying text, in deciding that Congress intended
that states have power to decide whether to provide unemployment benefits for strikers. 440
U.S. at 540.
80. 440 U.S. at 505.
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tively protected or prohibited by the NLRA.81 However, four of the
seven Justices who participated in the Malone decision thought that the
explicit language of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act,8
2
stating that the statute did not relieve any person from liability im-
posed by state law, was sufficient to sustain Minnesota's pension fund-
ing charge.83
The Occupational Safety and Health Act,8 4 which also encourages
states to assume the "fullest responsibility" for the administration and
enforcement of their occupational safety and health laws,8 5 declares
that
[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any
manner affect any workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or di-
minish or affect in any other manner the common law or statutory
rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under any
law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising
out of, or in the course of, employment.8 6
This federal statute, which applies to places of employment which may
or may not have a collective agreement, expressly preserves state au-
thority in the area of workers' compensation. When read in conjunc-
tion with other expressions of congressional intent87 and related lower
court precedent,88 a state law workers' compensation discharge claim
could be sustained as a congressionally intended exception to the gen-
eral Oliver-Malone rule of preemption based on the standard applied in
Malone.
"Health or Safety" Exception
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon89 and its prog-
eny90 the Supreme Court established a "local interest" exception to the
general rule that the jurisdiction of the NLRB preempts state law. In
these cases, "where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply
81. Id at 516 (Powell, J., dissenting).
82. 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309, repealed by Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, § Ill(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1031 (1976).
83. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505 (1978). See supra notes 58-63 &
accompanying text.
84. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-675 (1976).
85. Id at § 651(b)(I 1).
86. Id at § 653(b)(4).
87. See supra note 85; 28 U.S.C. 1445(c) (1976) (civil actions arising under workers'
compensation laws are not removable from state to federal courts).
88. See Brown Co., Absorbent Prods. Div. v. Department of Indus., 476 F. Supp. 209,
211-12 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (Oliver rule did not preempt authority of state law to require preg-
nancy benefits in collectively bargained-for disability plan). See also supra note 76 & ac-
companying text.
89. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
90. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 204 (1978); Farmer v.
Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1977).
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rooted in local feeling and responsibility," the Court could not infer
that Congress intended to preempt state law without compelling con-
gressional direction.9'
In New York Telephone, the plurality opinion found that Congress
had been sensitive to states' interest in developing unemployment com-
pensation programs and eligibility criteria.92 The Justices found it ap-
propriate to treat preemption of state law in this area as it had been
treated in the "local interest" cases, by balancing the federal and state
interests. 93
In Oliver and Malone, the Court recognized states' interest in regu-
lating health and safety.94 Based on the willingness of the Court to
balance federal and state interests in areas of local concern such as this,
it is likely that laws falling within the area of health or safety regulation
will be treated similarly to the state interests examined under Garmon's
local interest exception.
Workers' compensation laws would seem to be part of a state's
"industrial safety practices." 95 Further, workers' compensation laws
are within the broad authority to regulate the employment relationship
which states possess under their police powers.96 Consequently, mat-
ters arising under workers' compensation, including wrongful dis-
charge,97 apparently satisfy the threshold requirement of this exception
that the state law concern "local health or safety."98
A state generally has a "substantial interest" in the "health and
well-being" of its citizens in their employment.99 In particular, a state
91. 359 U.S. at 244.
92. 440 U.S. at 539.
93. Id. at 539-40. Justice Brennan also found this analysis persuasive. Id at 546-47 n.*
(Brennan, J., concurring).
94. Oliver, 358 U.S. at 297. Malone, 435 U.S. at 513 n.13. See R. GoRMAN, supra note
21, at 772-73.
95. See R. GORMAN, supra note 21, at 772; see also infra note 98.
96. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976).
97. Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 22 Cal. 3d 658, 669,
586 P.2d 564, 570, 150 Cal. Rptr. 250, 256 (1978) indicates that an anti-discharge provision is
an integral part of a state's workers' compensation system
98. The scope of the "health or safety" exception to "bargaining agreement" preemp-
tion apparently has never been litigated. See Porter v. Quillin, 123 Cal. App. 3d 869, 876,
177 Cal. Rptr. 45, 49 (1981); see also Recent Decisions, Malone v. White Motor Corporation,
435 U.S. 497 (1978), 17 DUQ. L. REV. 189, 198 n.54 (1978-1979); Note, supra note 77, at
1101. While the appellants in Malone argued that Minnesota's pension law came within the
exception, Justice Powell's dissent in Malone found that Minnesota's law fell outside the
health or safety exception. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 516 (1978). The
majority opinion, however, did not reach the issue and expressly preserved that possibility.
435 U.S. at 513 n.13. The only commentator to have addressed its scope speculated that
"industrial safety practices," wage and hour legislation, and other types of state laws may be
considered under this exception. R. GORMAN, supra note 21, at 772, 773.
99. Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 302-03 (1977).
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"has a substantial interest in protecting the integrity of its workers'
compensation system". 1°° Further, the Supreme Court is likely to give
greater weight to these considerations now than it might have given to
them in earlier decades. This is especially likely if, as has been argued,
the Court is moving towards greater accommodation of both federal
and state substantive authority in areas of regulation.' 0 ' In compari-
son, it is less important to protect federal interests by using preemption
because these interests are now being protected by a revitalized con-
tract clause. 102 Consequently, a workers' compensation discharge
claim may properly be sustained under the health or safety exception to
the general Oliver-Malone rule of preemption.
In sum, under current law all state *wrongful discharge actions
would presumptively be preempted by the general Oliver-Malone rule.
Some actions, such as those involving state workers' compensation
laws, may escape preemption under the two exceptions to that rule.
The difficulty in applying the Oliver-Malone rule, and developments
since the Oliver decision, together portend a narrowing of the scope of
bargaining agreement preemption. In Oliver, the Supreme Court chose
to protect collective bargaining agreements from state law by a sweep-
ing rule of preemption. At that time the principle of federalism and the
constitutional prohibition of state impairment of contracts were at low
ebb. These aspects of the constitutional landscape on which the Oliver
rule was formulated have changed. Consequently, the rules needed to
implement the policies of bargaining agreement preemption have
changed.
100. Vaughn v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 289 Or. 73, 82, 611 P.2d 281, 287
(1980).
101. See, eg., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); Catz & Lenard, The
Demise of the Implied Federal Preemption Doctrine, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295 (1977);
Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shfting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975); see also infra notes 103-06 & accompanying text. Wrongful
discharge actions alleging retaliation for pursuing workers' compensation (or for reporting
for jury service) do not fall within the scope of the holding of National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). (Isery involved federal regulation of the relationship between
states and their employees. Id at 836.
The Court's reasoning in Usery, however, arguably embraces workers' compensation
wrongful discharge actions. See id at 847 (state decisionmakers must have latitude in deter-
mining how "they will structure delivery of those governmental services which their citizens
require"); id at 851 n.16 (numerous line and support activities beyond those at issue in the
case may be protected from federal regulation); L. Tmma, supra note 6, at 308-18 (1978), 18
(Supp. 1979) (citizens' claims to services form the basis for the Usery decision); id at 308-09
n.9 (regulation of private as opposed to public employers seems not to be a sound basis for
limiting the Usery principle).
102. See infra notes 107-15 & accompanying text.
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Relevant Developments
Constitutional Law Developments
Two major developments in constitutional law have undercut the
basis for preempting a state law wrongful discharge claim by applica-
tion of the Oliver rule. The more general of these developments is the
revitalization of the principle of federalism in American law. 103 In Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery'0 4 the Supreme Court invalidated the
application of federal minimum wage and maximum hour provisions
to almost all employees of states and their political subdivisions. The
court grounded its decision in the importance of the sovereignty of
"States as States."'05
It is difficult to assess the impact this shift in constitutional philos-
ophy will have on preemption of state law wrongful discharge claims.
The shift may already encompass labor law to the same extent as other
substantive fields. 106 If so, deference to state sovereignty would tend to
prevent preemption of wrongful discharge actions implementing states'
public policies or protecting state "institutional" interests.
The constitutional development which bears more directly on the
vitality of the Oliver rule is the reemergence of contract clause limita-
tions on governmental action. 10 7 The major concern of Justice Powell
in Malone was the unexpected retroactive imposition of "substantial
financial liability, perhaps as large as $19 million," 0 8 on the em-
ployer's bargained-for pension plan. Because contract clause limita-
tions have been dormant for much of this century,109 the dissent's
reluctance to rely on the majority's decision to remand the contract
clause and other constitutional issues to the district court" 0 is under-
standable. Less than three months after its Malone decision, however,
the Supreme Court in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus"' invali-
dated the same Minnesota pension funding charge statute that had
been the subject of the Malone decision."I2
In Spannaus, the employer "was assessed an immediate pension
103. See Catz & Lenard, supra note 101, at 295.
104. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
105. Id. at 845.
106. Cf. New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 539-40
(1979).
107. The contracts clause provides: "No State shall ... pass any. . .Law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts ...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
108. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 516 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting).
109. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978); see also Note,
Revival Of The Contract Clause.- Aflied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus and United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 65 VA. L. REv. 377, 377 n.2 (1979).
110. 435 U.S. at 514-15.
111. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
112. Id at 236 n.1.
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funding charge of approximately $185,00." 3 The Court declared
that "the statute in question here nullifies express terms of the com-
pany's contractual obligations and imposes a completely unexpected li-
ability in potentially disabling amounts."' 4 While the Court indicated
that states retain power, within limits, to modify existing contractual
obligations, the facts of both Oliver and Malone clearly were outside
those limits." 5
The contract clause prohibits states from altering parties' rights
and duties under existing contracts. At the nadir of the clause's influ-
ence, the Oliver Court grounded its decision in the supremacy and
commerce clauses. The Court's decision in Spannaus thus eliminated
the need for the Oliver rule to the extent that the rule served as a surro-
gate for the contract clause.
The revitalizations of federalism and the contract clause are im-
portant constitutional developments which bear on the Oliver-Malone
rule and state law wrongful discharge actions. These developments
suggest that the Court may be receptive to modifications of labor law
preemption standards that would give more weight to the state policies
involved in certain wrongful discharge actions.
In his most recent article on labor law preemption Professor Cox
reviewed the decisions in New York Telephone and Malone and argued
that his approach to bargaining process preemption should be applied
to cases of bargaining agreement preemption.1 6 However, in cases of
bargaining agreement preemption, the Cox-New York Telephone plu-
rality test may be too narrow.
113. d at 247.
114. Id The Court in Spannaus continued the revitalization of the contract clause
which had begun the year before in United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1
(1977).
115. In Spannaus the Court said that the threshold inquiry was whether the state law
operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship. 438 U.S. at 244. In light
of the nature of this inquiry, the statute in Oliver, which apparently would have affected 600
employees, see 358 U.S. at 284 n.2, could constitute such an impairment.
116. Cox, Recent Developments, 1980, supra note 6, at 296. The Supreme Court has
divided the field of labor law preemption into two areas. One involves conduct subject to
NLRB jurisdiction and the other involves conduct related to collective bargaining which
Congress has indicated is beyond the power of States to regulate. See supra notes 39-46 &
accompanying text. In defining the latter area in New York Tel. Co. v. New York State
Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 530 n.16, Justice Stevens did not allude to the overruled
Briggs-Stratton case. See supra note 47. However, he also did not refer to either Oliver or
Malone. This is in spite of the fact that all members of the New York Telephone plurality
were also among the four member majority in Malone. The failure to refer to Oliver or
Malone therefore may indicate that a broadly defined Oliver rule will no longer be accepted.
See also Note, Private Preemption of State Labor Laws: .4 Constitutional Objection, 58 TEx.
L. REv. 1099, 1107 (1980) ("In the wake of New York Telephone, the Oliver rule seems
suspect")
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Critique Of The "Discrimination Against Collective Activity" Test For
Bargaining Agreement Preemption
Under the Cox-New York Telephone plurality test, which preempts
state law discrimination in favor of or against collective activity, Min-
nesota's pension funding charge in Malone would not have been pre-
empted because it did not differentiate between individually and
collectively bargained-for pension plans. 1 7 The dissenters in Malone,
however, objected to the statute because it altered the relative bargain-
ing strength of the parties to the collective agreement. This was the
major concern of Justice Stewart's brief dissent" 8 which adopted the
approach of the lower court that Congress intended the substantive
terms of collective agreements "to be controlled by and left to the free
play of economic forces."" 9 Justice Powell's dissent mostly stressed
"Itihe retroactivity feature" of the statute's operation. 20 He also con-
cisely stated what appears to be the underlying concern of Justice Stew-
art and the Eighth Circuit:
[T]he statute in this case removes from the bargaining table certain
means of dealing with an inevitable trade-off between somewhat con-
flicting industrial relations goals---the tension between maintaining
competitive standards of present compensation, and, at the same
time, creating a solvent fund for the security of long-term employees
upon retirement.12'
As noted at the outset of this Comment, there is a gulf between the
bargaining power of individual employees and unionized employees. ' 22
What Professor Cox's analysis seems to overlook, and what Justice
Powell's analysis seems to recognize, is that in enacting a funding
charge to be added to pension rights the Minnesota legislature must
have assumed that existing pension plans had certain average charac-
teristics. 23 The legislature probably took the pension rights of termi-
nable-at-will employees as its model. ' 24 Justice Powell implied that the
judgment exercised by the State Legislature of Minnesota with respect
to the "inevitable trade-offs" between present and future compensation
was the same judgment that the NLRA delegates to union negotiators:
"[I]n essence, Minnesota has restricted the available options to the fully
funded pension plan that vests upon 10 years of service, whenever an
117. See supra note 74 & accompanying text.
118. 435 U.S. at 515 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
119. White Motor Corp. v. Malone, 545 F.2d 599, 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
120. 435 U.S. 497, 516 (Powell, J., dissenting). His objections to retroactivity, it should
be noted, may already have been answered by the revitalization of the contract clause.
121. 435 U.S. at 516 (Powell, J., dissenting).
122. See supra note 4 & accompanying text.
123. "Pension" is a generic term for financial assets which vary widely in their charac-
teristics. Pension plans negotiated by major labor unions typically are more generous or
secure than plans offered to non-salaried employees who are terminable-at-will.
124. See 435 U.S. at 506-07; id at 516-18 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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employer ceases to operate a place of employment or pension plan."' 25
Absent more explicit congressional intent to subject collectively bar-
gained-for pension plans to state regulation, the dissenting justices in
Malone would have found the Minnesota statute to be preempted. 126
The Justices who dissented in Malone were concerned that states
not make decisions for employees which the NLRA authorizes unions
to make. In developing a new standard for bargaining agreement pre-
emption that addresses this concern, the Court could narrow the Oliver-
Malone rule by adding to the Cox-New York Telephone plurality test
an inquiry into the source of the substantive rights and interests pro-
tected by the state law. This inquiry is suggested by the Supreme
Court's decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 127
An Augmented Preemption Test: Source Of The Rights Being Asserted
And The Interests Protected
The general Oliver-Malone rule is broader than was necessary to
decide those cases. 128 Thus, even though that rule would preempt all
wrongful discharge claims, such claims can be distinguished from the
claims raised in both cases. The Oliver and Malone cases, respectively,
involved bargaining agreement provisions regarding rental payments
and pension benefits. The state laws in those cases purported to affect
rights which substantively originated in the collective agreements.' 29
In contrast, wrongful discharge claims seek a more de facto alteration
of the agreement. They ignore the existence of the agreement rather
than attempt to modify its terms. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
provides a principled basis for narrowing the application of the Oliver-
Malone rule to wrongful discharge actions. In doing so, the Alexander
125. Id at 516 (Powell, J., dissenting).
126. Id at 515 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id at 516 (Powell, J., dissenting). While beyond
the scope of this Comment, the concern of the dissenters in Malone may be answerable by a
constitutional consideration. The Oliver rule may not be supported by either congressional
intent or the case law on which it relies, and it may run afoul of the constitutional doctrine
against delegating governmental authority to private parties. See Note, supra note 116. As
early as 1940, two decades before Oliver, a commentator noted
It]hat a collective bargaining agreement should be considered as establishing a
"law of the land" for the industry is a notion which, at least in theory, is foreign to
our law. Moreover, the notion involves constitutional difficulties, especially the
conception against delegation of powers .... Law making by groups other than
traditionally elected or appointed law makers is said to be abhorrent to our form of
government.... In spite of the disfavor, however, collective bargaining agree-
ments have been increasingly assuming the role of establishing rules which, in ef-
fect, govern the given industry.
1 L. TELLER, LABOR DisPtrrEs AtI COLLECTrVE BARGAINING 520-21 (1940).
127. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
128. See supra notes 19, 52.
129. See supra notes 51-60 & accompanying text.
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principle accommodates the concern of the Justices who dissented in
Malone.
In Alexander, a black worker who was discharged by his employer
filed a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement between his
union and employer. After an arbitrator's ruling that the discharge was
for cause, the employee filed an action in federal district court alleging
that his discharge had resulted from racial discrimination in violation
of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.130 The Supreme Court
unanimously held that the adverse arbitral decision under the collective
bargaining agreement did not preclude the employee from suing under
title VII.131 The court declared that "[tihe distinctly separate nature of
these contractual and statutory rights is not vitiated merely because
both were violated as a result of the same factual occurrence."' 132 Fur-
thermore, the Court focused on the fact that the system created under
title VII was based on governmental interests very different from those
that were the focus of the NLRA. 133 Thus, Alexander demonstrates
that the system of rights under a collective bargaining agreement does
not necessarily foreclose the assertion of independent legal rights that
protect governmental interests separate from the NLRA.
All wrongful discharge actions involve substantive rights not to be
discharged which are independent of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.134 They are thus distinguishable from the Oliver and Malone
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
131. 415 U.S. at 46 n.6.
132. Id at 50. The Court went on to say that "a contractual right to submit a claim to
arbitration is not displaced simply because Congress also has provided a statutory right
against discrimination. Both rights have legally independent origins and are equally avail-
able to the aggrieved employee." Id at 52.
133. It is true, of course, that a union may waive certain statutory rights related to
collective activity, such as the right to strike . . . .These rights are conferred on
employees collectively to foster the processes of bargaining and properly may be
exercised or relinquished by the union as collective-bargaining agent to obtain eco-
nomic benefits for union members. Title VII, on the other hand, stands on plainly
different ground; it concerns not majoritarian processes, but an individual's right to
equal employment opportunities. Title VII's strictures are absolute and represent a
congressional command that each employee be free from discriminatory practices.
Of necessity, the rights conferred can form no part of the collective-bargaining
process since waiver of these rights would defeat the paramount congressional pur-
pose behind Title VII.
Id at 51 (citations omitted). Cf. Bald v. RCA Alascom, 569 P.2d 1328, 1335 (Alaska 1977).
See also supra note 9 & accompanying text.
134. The courts in Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo, & Ironton R.R. Co., 81 Mich. App.
489, 494, 265 N.W.2d 355, 387 (1978) and Vaughn v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 289 Or.
73, 81, 611 P.2d 281, 286 (1980), have indicated the importance of this. See Andrews v.
Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., 406 U.S. 320 (1972) (negative implication of the holding);
Bald v. RCA Alascom, 569 P.2d 1328, 1334 (Alaska 1977); Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610
S.W.2d 450, 453 n.3 (Tex. 1981). Alexander does not control the question of wrongful dis-
charge preemption because it involved congressional purposes in enacting two independent
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cases, in which the rights that the state laws attempted to modify were
grounded in the bargaining agreements. They also satisfy the require-
ment of the Alexander principle that the right be independent of the
collective agreement.
The dispositive consideration thus becomes whether the particular
wrongful discharge action protects governmental interests which are
separate from the NLRA. This is analagous to the concern of the dis-
senting Justices in Malone that states not make decisions for employees
that the NLRA authorizes only unions to make. Alexander thus sug-
gests a second element to be added to the Cox-New York Telephone
plurality test to be used in the area of bargaining agreement preemp-
tion. The result of the Cox-New York Telephone test is that unauthor-
ized state laws discriminating in favor of or against collective labor
activity should be preempted. This should be the first of two elements
of a test for bargaining agreement preemption. Under this part of the
test, wrongful discharge actions would be sustained. In that case, the
second element of the test, suggested by Alexander, should be applied.
When the substantive rights or interests are matters protected by the
NLRA, state law should be preempted. Alexander thus provides a pre-
emption test that satisfies the concern articulated by the dissenters in
Malone.
Separating Preempted From Nonpreempted Wrongful Discharge Claims
State law wrongful discharge actions provide employees with in-
dependent substantive rights not to be discharged from employment in
certain circumstances.1 35 These rights are provided regardless of
whether the terms and conditions of their employment are individually
or collectively bargained for. Such a claim by a unionized employee
apparently would not be preempted under the Cox-New York Tele-
phone plurality test. In order to apply the second element of the pro-
posed test, that is, whether the substantive rights or interests are matters
protected by the NLRA, it is necessary to distinguish among the vari-
ous types of wrongful discharge actions. These actions can be divided
into five categories, based on the types of interests that have been as-
serted. Some are grounded entirely in the employer-employee contrac-
tual relationship, while others involve not only employment concerns
but also substantial state public policy interests.
The first category of wrongful discharge actions involves the indi-
sources of federal rights, 415 U.S. at 48-49, rather than independent federal and state sys-
tems. The Supreme Court of Oregon and two commentators, however, have recognized its
usefulness in this context. See Vaughn v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 289 Or. 73,
86, 611 P.2d 281, 289 (1980); Summers, supra note 3, at 530 n.216; Note, supra note 10, at
1462.
135. See supra notes 11-16 & accompanying text.
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vidual employee's interest in job security, which is an important focus
of the NLRA. State laws have chosen to duplicate that protection in
some cases by allowing wrongful discharge claims on a theory of im-
plied-in-fact contract 136 and for breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing 137 implied by law. In such cases, state law accommo-
dates the very interest that the NLRA accommodates through the col-
lective bargaining process. The NLRA, establishes a system in which
the individual employment contract is superseded by the collective bar-
gaining agreement.1 38 Such state law wrongful discharge actions
should therefore be preempted. 139
A second category of wrongful discharge actions involves an em-
ployee's interest in receiving employment related benefits, such as a
pension' 4° or a very large sales commission.' 4 ' The collective bargain-
ing system is the source of a union member's right to a pension or sales
commission, and thus a wrongful discharge action brought to vindicate
such rights should be preempted. 42
Actions alleging discharge in retaliation for assertion of workers'
compensation rights constitute a third category. 43 Because state law
rather than the collective bargaining system is the source of an em-
ployee's right to workers' compensation, such claims should not be
preempted.
The fourth and fifth categories may be the most important types of
wrongful discharge claims. The three categories described above gen-
erally involve only employment related rights and duties. This is not
the case in claims involving "whistle blowing" or state "institutional"
interests. Both types of actions are devices by which states use private
litigation to further public policies encompassing concerns clearly
broader than the resolution of the legal relations between the
136. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927
(1981).
137. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., I I I Cal. App. 3d 443, 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722,
729 (1980).
138. See supra note 30 & accompanying text.
139. See Note, supra note 10, at 1457.
140. Savodnick v. Korvettes, 488 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
141. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
142. See supra note 32 & accompanying text.
143. The categories proposed here are not mutually exclusive, but rather characterize
the predominant governmental interests involved in the discharge actions. Workers' com-
pensation discharge actions are analyzed as a separate category because they involve inter-
ests from three of the other categories. As compensation to injured employees, they are
employment benefits; to the extent that they enforce a statutory scheme of general state
interest, they are like whistle blowing actions; and, because they involve a state administra-
tive apparatus which provides services to citizens, they involve state "institutional" interests.
Under the analysis of this Comment the dispositive consideration is the fact that the source
of the right to benefits is state law rather than the collective bargaining system.
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litigants. 144
Whistle blowing claims which comprise the fourth ctegory of
wrongful discharge actions protect a wide range of public policies. In
Michigan, for example, an employee was held to have stated a cause of
action when he alleged that he was discharged for refusing to manipu-
late pollution control reports. 45 A New Jersey case involved an em-
ployee who was discharged after internally protesting her employer's
decision to continue testing a potentially harmful drug on humans.1
46
The first California case authorizing a tort action for wrongful dis-
charge involved an employee who refused to commit the criminal act
of fixing gasoline prices. 147
The fifth category of wrongful discharge claims involves "institu-
tional" state interests. Proper claims have been stated, for example,
where employees were discharged for reporting for jury service, 148 act-
ing as an election poll official, 149 or seeking workers' compensation
benefits.' 50
The whistle blowing and state institutional interest actions clearly
demonstrate how some wrongful discharge actions can be based on
general state laws rather than labor laws.' 51 Whistle blowing actions,
for example, call public attention to the doings of an alleged law-
breaker. 52 They perform this function in a modern society of large
organizations for which external controls are arguably too ephemeral
or too complex for adequate enforcement of public policies. 153 Thus,
144. In this respect they are like actions by which a taxpayer may sue to prevent waste of
public funds, see, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526a (West 1979), and "private attorney
general" actions whereby a successful litigant who has vindicated an important public right
may recover attorneys' fees, see, e.g., id, § 1021.5 (West 1980).
145. Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo, & Ironton R.R., 81 Mich. App. 489, 496, 265 N.W.2d
385, 388 (1978). The action was held not to be preempted by the employee's collective bar-
gaining agreement under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-164 (1976). 81 Mich.
App. at 494, 265 N.W.2d at 388. However, the court also decided that since the trial court
had properly viewed the plaintiffs case in its most favorable light and found no issue of
material fact, summary judgment had been properly granted to defendants. Id. at 498, 265
N.W.2d at 390. Preemption under the Railway Labor Act was also addressed in Colorado
Anti-Discrimination Commission v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714 (1963).
146. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
147. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1980).
148. Eg., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
149. E.g., Kouff v. Bethlehem Alameda Shipyard, 90 Cal. App. 2d 322, 202 P.2d 1059
(1949).
150. See supra notes 10, 143.
151. See supra note 2.
152. Comment, supra note 14, at 777.
153. Id at 812 n.233. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit recently held that "the interests of
antitrust enforcement" gave a company's marketing director standing to sue for treble dam-
ages under the federal antitrust laws when he was discharged for objecting to the company's
alleged conspiracy to fix prices. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378, 1383-84 (9th
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wrongful discharge actions are not always employment disputes. For
preemption purposes they can be deemed state laws of general applica-
bility. Unlike the assumption common to both the ancient law of em-
ployment and to the NLRA that employment related rights and duties
are the only interests in such private controversies, some types of mod-
em wrongful discharge actions are devices which use private litigation
to further state policies not related to employment. 54 The concerns in
whistle blowing and state institutional interest discharge actions are far
removed from the interests protected by the NLRA, and such actions
should not be preempted.
Conclusion
The accelerating development of state law causes of action for
wrongful discharge, predicated on a variety of legal theories, brings to
light underlying problems in the field of federal labor law preemption.
Since they have evolved as "exceptions" to the general terminable-at-
will rule of employment, state law actions for wrongful discharge have
arisen in extreme circumstances where important state interests were
involved. It is therefore only natural that they test both the limits of
Congress' intent to preempt state law in enacting the NLRA, and con-
stitutionally based concerns about federalism. 155
Under present standards of bargaining agreement preemption all
wrongful discharge claims potentially are invalidated. There have
Cir. 1982) (certiorari pending). But see Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir.
1982).
If the need for whistle-blowing is positively correlated with organizations' size, it may
be noteworthy that whistle blowers who work for the federal government have their own
bimonthly publication, Impact Journal, edited by federal whistle blower Al Louis Ripskis.
"Washington Scene," San Francisco Chron., Oct. 2, 1981 at 10, col. 1.
154. See supra note 2.
155. It should be noted that these are the respective focuses of the two exceptions to the
general Oiiver-Malone rule of preemption. The Supreme Court has made the following ob-
servations concerning the scope of federal and state authority in labor law:
[I]n Garner v. Teamsters Union Justice Jackson stated that "[tihe National Labor
Management Relations Act. . . leaves much to the states, though Congress has
refrained from telling us how much. We must spell out from conflicting indica-
tions of Congressional will the area in which state action is still permissible."
"This penumbral area," declared Justice Frankfurter, "can be rendered progres-
sively clear only by the course of litigation." He later characterized the statutory
implications concerning what had been taken from the states and what had been
left to them as of a "Delphic nature, to be translated into concreteness by the pro-
cess of litigation elucidation."
MORRIS, supra note 27, at 783 (footnotes omitted). See, id at 783 n.12 concerning the ap-
propriateness in labor law of the analogy of the Delphic oracle to the relationship between
Congress and the Supreme Court. Morris cites E. 0. JAMEs, THE ANCIENT GODS 244 (1960)
to the effect that at Delphi the "holy ones" interpreted the unintelligible murmurs of the
prophetess who expresses the will of Apollo. Id.
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been several major developments, however, relevant to narrowing bar-
gaining agreement preemption. In Oliver, the Supreme Court chose to
protect collective bargaining agreements from state law by a sweeping
rule of preemption. At that time the principle of federalism and the
constitutional prohibition of state impairment of contracts were at low
ebb. These contours of the constitutional landscape on which the Oli-
ver-Mfalone rule was formulated have changed. Consequently, the
rules needed to implement the policies of bargaining agreement pre-
emption have changed. First, the reemergence of federalism in consti-
tutional law suggests that state interests in wrongful discharge suits are
not to be taken lightly. National League of Cities v. Usery156 implies
that preemption may not be proper where a state institution, such as a
system of jury service or perhaps its workers' compensation system, is
involved in the challenge. Second, the contract clause of the Constitu-
tion once again is being invoked to protect private agreements.
The general constitutional developments have been paralleled by
Supreme Court decisions which further support a narrowing of bar-
gaining agreement preemption. In the closely related area of "bargain-
ing process" preemption, the plurality opinion in New York Telephone
Co. v. New York State Department of Labor S7 largely adopted the ex-
tremely narrow preemption test advocated by Professor Cox. Follow-
ing that judicial recognition of the test, Professor Cox argued for
application of this narrow test in the area of bargaining agreement
preemption.
In the bargaining agreement context, however, the Cox-New York
Telephone plurality test may be too narrow. It arguably does not re-
spond to the concern of certain Justices that state laws affecting pen-
sions or wages should be preempted because Congress has delegated to
union and management negotiators the task of striking bargains on
economic issues. By that reasoning, state laws should not be allowed to
interfere with those compromise bargains.
To accommodate this concern, this Comment borrows from the
reasoning of Alexander v. Gardner Denver Co. 158 to formulate a second
element to be added to the Cox-New York Telephone plurality preemp-
tion test. This augmented test should replace the present standard for
bargaining agreement preemption.
The NLRA establishes a framework for collective bargaining that
state law may not disrupt by enforcing its own views as to the proper
accommodation of the various groups interested in collective bargain-
ing. Under the augmented test, state law causes of action predicated on
interests which are within the NLRA scheme, such as those protecting
156. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
157. 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
158. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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job security, wages and pensions, should be preempted. Actions by
which states enforce workers' compensation systems, whistle blowing
interests and jury service should be sustained.
Alan J Haus*
* Member, Third Year Class.
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